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CONSUMER INVOLVEMENT AND THE
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT
Joseph A. Page* .
Congress and the public must be kept fully informed and made
welcome as participants in the regulatory process. We've
learned that the voice of the citizen consumer must be granted
at least equal access to the regulatory process as
industry . . . . [C]itizen advocates both within and without
government must have access to the regulators, so that consumer safety does not grow into a partnership of convenience
between the regulator and the regulated, with the public interest subverted, and all but forgotten. 1

The notion that consumers should actively participate in the
administration and enforcement of a federal statute designed to
protect them from unreasonable risks of harm is a distinguishing
feature of the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA). 2 History
suggests that when Congress entrusts to a federal agency authority to intrude into the market place on ~ehalf of the general
public (or a segment thereof), in a matter of time the agency
becomes overly responsive to, or even captive of, the corporate
interests subject to regulation. 3 The absence of public-interest
pressures- a very raison d'etre for the setting up of the regula* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center; A.B., 1955, LL.B., 1958, LL.M.,
1964, Harvard.
This article is the outgrowth of a speech entitled "Consumer Participation in
Standards-Setting,'' delivered in Washington, D.C., on June 11, 1973, at a conference
sponsored by the PRODUCT SAFETY LETI'ER and published in PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRIEFING
CONFERENCE ON THE CoNSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT 59 (D. Swit ed. 1973); and a speech
entitled "Consumer Remedies and Consumer Participation under the New Consumer
Product Safety Act," delivered in Dallas, Tex., on June 27, 1973, at a conference sponsored
by the American Society of Safety Engineers, and published in PROCEEDINGS OF THE PRoFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE 287 (1973).
The author wishes to thank Bruce I. Bertelson and Nancy L. Southard, students at
the Georgetown University Law Center, for their help in the preparation of this article.
1. Opening remarks of Senator Frank E. Moss (D.-Utah) at Hearings on S.983,
S.1658, S.I791, Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 27, pt.
1, at 2-3 (1971)[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
2. Pub. L. No. 92-573 (Oct. 28, 1972), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2051-81 (Supp. 1973). The Act
will hereinafter be cited to its public-law section number only.
3. As Justice Douglas noted in his dissenting opinion in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 745-46 (1972), "[T]he pressures on agencies for favorable action one way or the
other are enormous. . . .The federal agencies of which I speak are not venal or corrupt.
But they are notoriously under the control of powerful interests who manipulate them
through advisory committeees, or friendly working relations, or who have that natural
affinity with the agency which in time develops between the regulator and the regulated."
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tory scheme - tends to make the agency vulnerable to influences
from the private sector. 4
To avoid the development of a "partnership of convenience
between the regulator and the regulated, " 5 the CPSA provides
legal points of access for consumers in the setting and enforcing
of product safety standards. In addition, the Act facilitates a free
flow of information to consumers, as part of a philosophy of helping consumers help themselves. Basic to this experiment in public participation is the assumption that those for whose benefi
the Act was passed have at stake something too important to
leave exclusively to the regulators. In this respect, the CPSA
shares an approach taken by the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 6 which seeks to encourage individual workers and their unions to join in the struggle against job-related illnesses and accidents.7
The purpose of this paper is to analyze those sections of the
CPSA that invite consumer involvement; to present a brief survey of how the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC),
the independent agency administering the Act, has tried to interact with consumers in the first months of the Commission's existence; and to offer a few speculations on the longer-range prospects
for meaningful consumer participation in the work of the Commission.

I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The passage of the Consumer Product Safety Act culminated
the work begun by the National Commission on Product Safety
(NCPS), a bipartisan presidential commission formed by a joint
resolution of Congress in late 19678 to examine ". . . the scope
and adequacy of measures now employed to protect consumers
against unreasonable risk of injuries which may be caused by
hazardous household products." 9 In June of 1970, after nearly two
4. This point has been elaborated at some length by Ralph Nader in testimony in
support of a federal Consumer Protection Agency. See Hearings on S.1177 and H.R. 10835,

Before the Subcomm. on Executive Reorganization and Government Research of the
Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 55-74 (1971); Hearings
on H.R. 14, H.R. 21, H.R. 564, Before the Subcomm. on Legislation and Military Operations of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 266-91
(1973).
5. See note 1 supra.
6. 29
§§ 651-78 (1970).
7. See J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, BI'ITER WAGES: THE NADER REPORT ON DISEASE AND
INJORY ON THE JOB 185-89, 242-43 (1973).
8. Act of Nov. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 466.
9. Id. § 2(a), 81 Stat. 467.

u.s.c.
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years of hearings 10 and studies, 11 the NCPS published a report
which recommended new legislation. 12 A little more than a year
later, congressional hearings began, focusing on a version of the
bill drafted by the NCPS and on an Administration proposal, 13
lasting for almost a year, 14 and eventually producing the
Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972. Two major controversies
emerged from the congressional hearings and debates: whether
the agency to administer the new law should be independent or
part of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; 15 and
whether the functions of the Food and Drug Administration relating to food, drugs, cosmetics, and medical devices should be
transferred to the new agency. 16 The bill as enacted made the
Consumer Product Safety Commission an independent regulatory body, 17 and left the Food and Drug Administration to continue regulating food, drugs, cosmetics, and medical devices. 18
The various provisions dealing with consumer involvement
evoked much less controversy, despite their novelty, perhaps because of the larger dimensions of the issues mentioned above. 19
Section 10 of the CPSA gives consumers and other interested
parties the right to petition the Commission to commence a proceeding for the issuance, amendment, or revocation of product
10. See NATIONAL CoM~nsstON ON PRoDucr SAFETY, HEARINGS (1970)(9 vols.).
11. HEFFRON, FEDERAL CONSUMER SAFETY LEGISLATION (Special Report prepared for
the NCPS) (1970); NCPS STAFF REPORT, PRoDucr INJURY & IDENTIFICATION (June 1970);
NCPS STAFF REPORT, INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION (June 1970); NCPS STAFF REPORT, PRoDucr SAFETY LAw & ADMINISTRATION: FEDERAL, STATE, LocAL AND COMMON-LAw (June 1970).
12. NATIONAL CoM~nsstoN ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FiNAL REPORT (June 1970).
13. S. 1797, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 8110, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
14. See Senate Hearings; Hearings on H.R. 8110, H.R. 8157, H.R. 260 (and identical
bills), H.R. 3813 (and identical bills), Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., ser.
59-61 (1971-72); See also Hearings on S. 3419, Before the Subcomm. on Executive Reorganization and Government Research of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Hearings on S. 3419, Before the Subcomm. on Health of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
15. See 29 CONGRESSIONAL Q. 2628-29 (Dec. 18, 1971); 30 id. 1614-15 (July 1, 1972).
16. See Gardner, Congressional Battle over FDA Control Focuses on Product-Safety
Legislation, 4 NATIONAL J. 987 (June 10, 1972).
17. Section 4.
18. Section 3(a)(1)(H) and (l)(excluding these products from the coverage of the
Act).
19. Indeed, when the occasion for a controversy arose over the alleged lobbying by
representatives of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger against the citizen-enforcement section
of the Act (see note 39 infra), congressional staffers hoped to use the incident at the HouseSenate Conference to salvage the transfer of FDA functions to the new agency, a step
taken in the Senate, but not the House version of the bill. Interviews with congressional
staff personnel, Sept. 1972. Their efforts failed.
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safety rules (which by definition may be either product standards
or product bannings) .20 This provision originated in the draft proposal of the NCPS, 21 and in effect reiterated a right already conferred by the Administrative Procedure Act. 22 However, § 10 further requires that the Commission act upon a petition within one
hundred twenty days of its receipt, and the petitioner may bring
an action in a United States District Court to contest a denial.
The court must then look at the evidence de novo and decide
whether the petitioner, by a preponderance of the evidence, has
established that the product in question presents an unreasonable risk of injury, and whether the Commission's failure to commence a rulemaking proceeding unreasonably exposes consumers
to such unreasonable risk of harm. A finding in the petitioner's
favor will result in a court order directing the Commission to
commence the action requested by the petition. However, § 10(g)
provides that recourse to the courts under § 10 will not be available until three years after the date of enactment of the CPSA
(i.e., until October 27, 1975).
Initiation of rulemaking by court order developed out of the
House-Senate Conference Report, 23 and took its origin from a
provision in the Senate version of the bill, which authorized any
person who alleged that an act or omission of the agency exposed
him to an unreasonable risk of harm from a food, drug, or consumer product to petition the agency to take specific action to
eliminate the risk. 24 Upon denial of the petition, the petitioner
could bring an action in a United States Court of Appeals, which
would then decide, upon a preponderance of the evidence,
whether the act or omission in question did expose the petitioner
to an unreasonable risk of harm. A finding in the affirmative
would compel the court to direct the agency to take appropriate
action (which might involve rulemaking or enforcement). The
Conference modified this provision and added it to the section
allowing petitions for the issuance, amendment, or revocation of
product safety rules, thus creating a novel approach to judicial
review. 25
20. Section 3(a)(2).
21. Section 10, Proposed Consumer Product Safety Act, FINAL REPORT OF THE NA·
TIONAL COMMISSION ON PRooucr SAFETY (June 1970)[hereinafter cited as NCPS PROPOSED
Acr).
22. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (e)(1970).
23. H.R. Rep. No. 1593, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48 (1972).
24. S. 3419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 112 (1972).
25. See Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act,
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Section 7 of the Act spells out the various procedures to be
followed in the fashioning of a proposed product safety standard.
One option open to the Commission is to solicit offers from outside persons or groups 26 to formulate proposed standards, and to
accept one or more of the offers received, upon a determination
that the offeror is technically competent and likely to develop the
standard within the prescribed time limit and according to CPSC
regulations. In order to encourage consumer groups to apply,
§ 7(d)(2) permits the Commission to contribute to an offeror's
costs in preparing a standard. 27 This provision originated in the
Administration bill. 28 In addition, § 7(d)(3)(B) requires that an
offeror accepted by the Commission enable other interested parties (including consumers and consumer groups) to share in the
development of the proposed standard. In the Senate floor debate
on the bill, an amendment was added that would require participation by interested parties "in accordance with accepted standards of due process, including adequate notice to all participants
and access to all relevant records and documents." 29 The Conference Report, however, deleted this language without explanation.30
Section 11 provides for judicial review of consumer product
safety rules. The Act confers standing to review upon not only
persons adversely affected by the rule, but also consumers and
consumer groups, thus facilitating consumer challenges to one
aspect of the Commission's rulemaking activity. 31
Section 15 furnishes guidelines and procedures under which
the Commission can compel manufacturers, distributors andretailers to notify consumers of "substantial product hazards, " 32
20 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 899, 927-28 (1973).
26. Offerors may include any state or federal agency, other than the Commission
itself. Section 7(b)(4).
27. The House Report states: "It is expected that the Commission will exercise its
authority under this section to provide assistance to consumer organizations or groups
which are less likely to be able to bear the costs of standards development than are
industrial trade organizations." H.R. Rep. No. 1153, 92d Gong., 2d Sess. 34 (1972).
28. S. 1797, 92d Gong., 1st Sess. § 6(c)(2)(1971).
29. 118 GoNG. REc. S.9925 (daily ed. June 21, 1972).
30. H.R. Rep. No. 1593, 92d Gong., 2d Sess. 45 (1972).
31. The Senate bill provided for judicial review at the behest of any person affected
by not only product safety rules, but also rules applicable to standards development,
compliance testing, and the conduct of safety analyses by manufacturers. 8.3419, 92d
Gong., 2d Sess. § 310 (1972). The Conference Report dropped the latter category. H.R.
Rep. No. 1593, 92d Gong., 2d Sess. 48-49 (1972). Therefore, judicial review of rules falling
into that category would be obtainable only in accordance with the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970).
32. Section 15 defines "substantial product hazard" as the violation of a consumer
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and to repair or replace the product or refund the purchase price.
Consumers may participate in the CPSC's determination of
whether "substantial product hazard" exists, and whether to require notification, repair, replacement, or refund, but the Commission may make these decisions only after giving the affected
companies an opportunity for a trial-type hearing under the
Administrative Procedure.Act. 33
One of the most innovative features of the CPSA is its provision for enforcement by private individuals, including consumers.
Section 24 permits private enforcement of product safety rules
and § 15 orders, so long as no CPSC enforcement proceeding
based on the same alleged violation is pending. Thirty days notice
to the Commission must be given, after which an "interested
party" may bring suit in a United States District Court against
the alleged violator.
This provision first appeared in tire Administration bill. 34
The Senate subsequently adopted a version which limited private
enforcement to persons "who may be exposed to unreasonable
risk of injury or death presented by a consumer product," but also
extended to such persons a right to enforce an order declaring a
product to create an imminent hazard. 35 At the same time, the
Senate added a provision enabling private individuals to bring a
civil action to compel the agency to take enforcement action with
respect to a "food, drug, or consumer product presenting an unreasonable risk of injury or death." 38
On the House side, the private-enforcement provision of the
Administration bilP7 became part of the bill reported out by a
majority of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 38 and thereafter adopted by the House. At this point, a
mild controversy flared over the alleged lobbying by representaproduct safety rule which creates a substantial risk of injury to the public, or a product
defect which creates a substantial risk of injury to the public.
33. 5 u.s.c. § 554 (1970).
34. S. 1797, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 16(d)(1971).
35. S. 3419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 316(d)(1)(1972).
36. S. 3419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 112(a)-(b) (1972). In an earlier draft of the Senate
bill, Section 112 permitted any person to bring a civil action against an agency employee
for a violation of a statutory duty under the Act. The court could enjoin the violation, and
even impose a fine or prison sentence on the individual employee. S. 983, S. 1797, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 112 (Comm. Print No. 1, Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Oct. 1971). This
provision was dropped in the bill as reported out by the Senate Commerce Committee.
See S. Rep. No. 749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
37. H.R. 8110, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 16(d)(1971).
38. H.R. Rep. No. 1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1972).
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tives of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger against private enforcement and also against § 23, creating a federal damages remedy
for persons injured because of a knowing and wilful violation of a
product safety rule. 39 The Conference Committee then adopted
the House version. 40
Under § 24, a person seeking enforcement may ask for attorneys' fees, but upon such a demand the court must award costs,
including attorneys' fees, to the prevailing party. For attorneys
representing consumers or consumer groups, this may involve a
substantial gamble. 41
Section 6 of the Act provides for public disclosure of information in the possession of the Commission, subject to various exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act. 42 In addition, § 25( c)
calls for the public release of accident and investigation reports
made pursuant to the CPSA by officers or employees of the Commission, subject to the deletion of the identity of individuals involved and to the protection of trade secrets, but not subject to
the other exceptions set out in the Freedom of Information Act.
The Senate bill presented in greater detail the agency's
public-disclosure responsibilities, such as the maintenance of a
public-information room and the availability of copying facilities
at minimum cost to the users. 43 The Conference Committee
dropped these provisions from the final version of the Act. 44
Section 28 of the Act requires the Commission to create a
Product Safety Advisory Council, which it may consult before
39. While the bill was before the House, Thomas G. Corcoran, a Washington attorney, accompanied by Rowland F. Kirks, an administrative aide to the Chief Justice,
visited House Speaker Carl Albert and lobbied against Sections 23, 24 and 25 of the Act.
Corcoran also distributed to key Congressmen memoranda dated Aug. 18, 1972 and Aug.
31, 1972 (copies on file with the author) opposing the creation of consumer remedies under
the CPSA and referring heavily to statements by the Chief Justice against the overburdening of the federal courts. The story broke in Jack Anderson's column, which quoted
Corcoran as admitting that "Kirks, acting for the Chief Justice, asked me to take him to
see the Speaker." Washington Post, Oct. 5, 1972, at H7, col. 5. See also Graham, Burger
Aide Linked to a Bid to Weaken Product Safety Bill, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1972, at 1, col.
4 (N.J. ed.). The Chief Justice refused comment on the incident. Washington Post, Oct.
19, 1972, at A34, col. 1. For a different version of the story, to the effect that Corcoran
requested Kirks to accompany him on the visit, see Goulden, The Washington Legal
Establishment, WASHINGTONIAN, Oct. 1973, at 87.
40. H.R. Rep. No. 1593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1972).
41. It is also conceivable that competing manufacturers may resort to Section 24.
Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 899, 949 (1973).
42. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(1970).
43. S. 3419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 109, 113, 114 (1972).
44. H.R. Rep. No. 1593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 38-41 (1972).
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taking regulatory action. Five of the Council's fifteen members
must be chosen from consumer and community organizations and
recognized consumer leaders.
One final aspect of the legislative history merits mention.
The NCPS bill would have created a Consumer Safety Advocate
to be appointed by the President for a seven-year term, with
broad responsibility to represent consumer interests before the
agency. 45 The functions of the Advocate resembled some of the
functions to be exercised by the proposed Consumer Protection
Agency, which pending legislation sought to establish in order to
represent the interests of consumers generally throughout the federal administrative process. 46 This provision disappeared from the
bill after the Senate hearings.
II.

METHODS OF CONSUMER INPUT

The formal launching of the CPSC took place on May 14,
1973, when four of its five commissioners took the oath of office. 47
The inevitable problems of organizing a new agency followed, but
by mid-summer, the Commission was operational. 48 In subsequent months, the CPSC took a number of steps designed to
involve consumers in its work and to communicate with the general public. Though an assessment of these measures at this point
in time would be premature, they do provide some useful insights
into the thinking of the Commission.
An early CPSC decision was to adopt a so-called "goldfish
bowl" approach in dealing with outside parties. On September
21, 1973, the Commission promulgated final regulations 49 providing that public notice, either in the Federal Register or on a
calendar available to anyone, be given for most meetings between
individual commissioners or CPSC staff members and outsiders. 5°
45. NCPS PROPOSED Ar:r § 4.
46. See, e.g., S. 1177, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. Rep. No. 542, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. ( 1971).
47. A scant three hours after being sworn in, the four commissioners testified before
the House Committee on Appropriations. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Agriculture- Environmental and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Appropriations,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 8, at 1 (1973).
48. The fifth commissioner, R. David Pittle, did not take office until Oct. 1973. See
2 Paoour:r SAFETY LETIER 4 (No. 41, Oct. 8, 1973).
49. It is ironic that the Commission launched its "goldfish bowl" policy by promulgating final regulations, instead of publishing them first as proposed rules and inviting
public comment.
50. CPSC, Procedural Policy on Meetings, Prior Public Notice, and Records of Proceedings, 38 Fed. Reg. 27214 (Oct. 1, 1973).
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Detailed summaries of what transpired would have to be kept for
most of these sessions, 51 and, as the preamble to the regulation
states, "meetings and records will generally be open to the public
unless reasons of propriety exist to the contrary." 52 Senator Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, was so impressed with this policy that he circulated the regulations to a number of other federal agencies and urged that they
adopt similar procedures. 53
The importance of advance notice of meetings and of the
accessibility of detailed summaries cannot be overstated. Consumer representatives and advocates need to know what arguments and information regulated corporations and their trade
associations are placing before the Commission so that adequate
and timely rebuttals can be prepared. 54
51. Meeting summaries indicate the issues leading to or resolved by the meeting. A
summary should contain "positions, responses, and initiatives displayed by the primary
participants," but only "[w]hen appropriate to the public interest." Id. § 1001.60(b)(2).
Summary minutes must be kept for meetings of individual commissioners and outside
parties if the meeting is (a) specified by statute; (b) with representatives of organizations
concerning a matter before the Commission; or (c) "concerned with any other matter of
substantial interest." Meetings of Commission staff and outside parties must be announced in advance in the Federal Register if they concern matters for which summary
minutes would be required for meetings between individual commissioners and outside
parties. Summary minutes must be kept for meetings of CPSC staffers and outsiders when
prior Federal Register notice has been given. All other meetings between staffers and
outsiders must be announced on the public calendar. Id. at 27215.
52. Id. at 27214.
53. See 2 PRooucr SAFETY LETIER 2 (No. 43, Oct. 22, 1973). Ralph Nader has also
praised the Commission's "goldfish bowl" policy. Id. On the other hand, Food and Drug
Administration General Counsel Peter B. Hutt, commenting on CPSC information policies, has stated that the Commission has "a marvelous PR gimmick, but I don't see that
there's any substance in it." 2 PRooucr SAFETY LETrER 2 (No. 52, Dec. 24, 1973). Hutt's
deprecation reflects a reaction to consumerist pressures that FDA emulate the CPSC
approach. FDA Commissioner Dr. Alexander Schmidt took a similar view at a meeting
with consumer advocates in Jan. 1974, when he rejected a suggestion that his agency adopt
the "goldfish bowl" philosophy. 36 F.D.C. REPORTS 17 (No. 2, Jan. 14, 1974).
Of course, how well the CPSC regulations work will depend upon the interpretation
of vague terms such as "reasons of propriety," "appropriate to the public interest" and
"matters of substantial interest," and the seriousness with which the Commission implements its policy. Already there has been criticism of the latter. See note 78 infra.
54. A good illustration of the sort of practice the CPSC regulations should prevent is
the development of crib regulations by FDA's Bureau of Product Safety. On Jan. 31, 1973,
Malcolm Jensen, Bureau Director, sent to a number of corporations which would be
affected a draft of the proposed regulations, along with a copy of a University of Michigan
study that provided the technical basis for the draft. Letter from Malcolm Jensen to L.
B. Moss, Pres., Mapes Industries, Inc. (copy on file with author). The companies were
invited to a meeting with officials of the Bureau of Product Safety. No consumer representatives received an advanced copy of the proposed regulations, nor invitations to the
meeting, which was held on Feb. 14, 1973. At the meeting, corporate officials complained
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Another policy the Commission has adopted is to hold, under
authority of§ 27(a) of the Act, frequent public hearings on specific issues, in order to enable any interested party, including
consumers, to present views and data.
The Commission has sought to encourage consumer petitions
under § 10 of the CPSA. 55 As of this writing, two such petitions
have met with denial, 56 and several are pending. In addition,
consumer groups have petitioned the CPSC to take action under
the Hazardous Substances Act 51 and the Flammable Fabrics
Act, 58 both of which the Commission now administers under the
CPSA. 59
The CPSC has proposed regulations that will govern the development of product safety standards under § 7. 60 A noteworthy
aspect of the preparation of these rules was the circulation of a
pre-publication draft to industry and consumer representatives,
and a meeting between the Commission and interested parties to
discuss them. 61 The proposed regulations specifically address
themselves to the stimulation of consumer participation in the
process. 62
that the proposal, which called for a maximum 214-inch space between crib slats, would
affect 90% of present production, did not take into account a current wood shortage, and
would create a "sensitivity contact barrier between mother and child." Memorandum of
Meeting re Cribs, Bureau of Product Safety, FDA, Feb. 14, 1973 (copy on file with the
author). The proposed standard as published required a maximum slat spacing of 2%
inches. FDA, Baby Cribs: Proposed Classification as Banned Hazardous Substance, 38
Fed. Reg. 9312 (Apr. 13, 1973).
55. "We're not going to establish complicated procedure under section 10. Simply
write us a letter, if you like, outlining the problem as you see it, ask the Commission toi
take that action which you believe appropriate, and I can assure you that we will give it
very serious consideration." Remarks of Richard 0. Simpson, Chairman, CPSC, Before
the Consumers Union, Iowa Consumers League Annual Meeting, Iowa City, Iowa, Oct.
13, 1973, at 6 (copy on file with author).
56. The Commission denied a petition of the National Football League Players Association to initiate a proceeding to promulgate a standard for artificial turf on the ground
that the evidence was insufficient to support the proposition that football players sustain
more frequent or severe injuries playing on artificial rather than natural turf, and that
any action taken by the CPSC to reduce football injuries should be directed at all the
various causes of such injuries. 38 Fed. Reg. 34361 (Dec. 13, 1973). The Commission also
turned down a request for the issuance of a rule relating to fondue cooking pots, on the
ground that most of the reported injuries associated with the use of the product were
relatively minor. 38 Fed. Reg. 34758 (Dec. 18, 1973).
57. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1261-73 (1970).
58. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1191-1204 (1970).
59. Section 30(a).
60. CPSC, Consumer Product Safety Standards: Requirements and Procedures, 39
Fed. Reg. 1152 (Jan. 4, 1974).
61. 38 Fed. Reg. 22427 (Aug. 20, 1973).
62. For example, upon commencement of a proceeding for the development of a
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Since no product safety rules have yet been issued under the
CPSA, there have been no occasions for § 24 private-enforcement
suits. However, consumers have joined in CPSC compliance efforts under the consumer deputy program, a campaign launched
during the 1973 Christmas season to identify retail establishments selling toys that had been banned under the Toy Safety
and Child Protection Act. 63 Volunteers visited stores in search of
forbidden toys, seeking removal by the retailer and reporting violations to CPSC Regional Offices, which had follow-up responsibility.64 The Commission is generally satisfied with the results of
the program, and contemplates expanding it to other areas. 65
Communication back and forth between the public and the
CPSC has taken place through the media of consumer-complaint
letters, CPSC publicity releases and a telephone "hot line" service. Complaint letters have been averaging nearly five hundred a
month in the first months of the Commission's existence. 56 One
important function served by these letters relates to defect notification. Section 15 of the CPSA requires manufacturers, distributors, and retailers to report product defects which create a "substantial risk of injury to the public." 67 The Commission may then
determine to take regulatory action and to issue a public warning.
Consumers are in a position to provide the agency with the initial
standard, the Commission would issue a press release inviting interested persons to submit offers. CPSC, Consumer Product Safety Standards: Requirements and Procedures
§ 1105.3(b), 39 Fed. Reg. 1152, 1153 (Jan. 4, 1974). At or near the time of publication of
a Federal Register acceptance notice, the Commission would issue a press release identifying the person or persons whose offer has been accepted, inviting interested persons to
participate in the development of the standard, and informing them of how they might
participate. !d. § 1105.6(e).
The Commission is also planning to compile a roster of consumers interested and
willing to evaluate safety standards being developed by outside offerors under § 7(d).
Letter from Commissioner Constance B. Newman to author, March 19, 1974.
63. This statute is part of the Hazardous Substances Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-73
(1970).
64. See CPSC Launches Nationwide Toy Safety Campaign, CPSC Press Release,
Oct. 15, 1973. The campaign continued a program begun by FDA's Bureau of Product
Safety in 1972. See Ross, Policing Toys, Washington Post, June 24, 1972, at B2, col. 1.
65. Volunteers found 1,228 toys that had been banned and another 925 toys that
appeared to be dangerous. The Commission is now planning to have volunteers survey
stores for compliance with poison prevention packaging regulations for aspirin and certain
kinds of liquid furniture polish. CPSC Press Release, March-April1974.
66. Interview with John Rogers, Bureau of Compliance, CPSC, Feb. 6, 1974.
67. "Substantial product hazard" is defined as a failure to comply with an applicable
product safety rule, creating a substantial risk of injury to the public, or "a product defect
which (because of the pattern of defect, the number of defective products distributed in
commerce, the severity of the risk, or otherwise) creates a substantial risk of injury to the
public." Section 15(a).
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notice of defects. This occurred for the first time in the case of
the "Little Wonder TV Antenna." A purchaser of one of these
devices warned the Commission that they could cause electric
shock and even electrocution. 68 After an investigation confirmed
that the product did present a hazard, the Commission sent out
a press release urging 'consumers to unplug and disconnect the
devices, and commenced steps to remove them from the market. 09
In addition to triggering publicity and regulatory action
against a hazardous product, consumer complaints can give the
Commission an indication of how well companies are complying
with their legal obligation under § 15 to report serious product
defects. Failure to comply is itself a prohibited act, 70 punishable
by both civil71 and criminal sanctions. 72
The Commission has generated a steady stream of press releases warning of product hazards. 73 After imposing a ban on
aerosol spray glues suspected of causing chromosome breakage
and birth defects/4 the CPSC set up a toll-free "hot line" to
handle phone calls from consumers requesting information about
the product. 75 The service is now a permanent feature, offering
information on products and receiving consumer complaints. As
of early February, 1974, it was handli:pg about eight hundred calls
a week. 76
Consumer representatives have not abandoned the idea of
installing a Consumer Safety Advocate77 at the Commission. Two
attorneys for the Washington office of Consumers Union have
68. See Remarks of Richard 0. Simpson, Chairman, CPSC, supra note 55, at 7.
69. CPSC Warns of Electric Shock Dangers from "Little Wonder TV Antenna,"
CPSC Press Release, Aug. 21, 1973.
70. Section 19(a)(4).
71. Section 20.
72. Section 21.
73. E.g., CPSC Warns of Fire Hazard in Decorative Fireplace Units, CPSC Press
Release, Nov. 10, 1973; CPSC Warns of Dangers from "Rogers" Disposable Adjustable
Butane Lighter, CPSC Press Release, Nov. 21, 1973.
74. CPSC, Order Deeming Certain Spray Adhesives to be Banned Hazardous Substances Due to Finding of Imminent Hazard to the Public Health, 38 Fed. Reg. 22569
(Aug. 22, 1973); CPSC, Certain Additional Spray Adhesives: Banning as Imminent Haz·
ard, 38 Fed. Reg. 23355 (Aug. 29, 1973); CPSC, Certain Spray Adhesives Presenting an
Imminent Hazard: Amendment of Banning Order, 38 Fed. Reg. 25216 (Sept. 12, 1973).
Subsequently, on the basis of further study, the Commission has decided to lift the ban.
CPSC, Spray Adhesives: Intention to Withdraw, 39 Fed. Reg. 3582 (Jan. 28, 1974).
75. See CPSC Sets "Spray Adhesive Information Line" to Handle Calls from Con·
cerned Physicians, Consumers, CPSC Press Release, Sept. 7, 1973.
76. Interview with Gerri Smith, Consumer Education Division, Bureau of lnformn·
tion and Education, CPSC, Jan. 29, 1974.
77. See notes 45-46 supra, and accompanying text.
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requested the CPSC on its own initiative to create such a position, which would handle consumer complaints, represent consumer viewpoints at the Commission staff level, and act as liaison
between the CPSC and consumer groups. 78 The proposal was rejected, however, on the ground that the structures and procedures
of the Commission were adequately serving the functions suggested for the Advocate. 79
CONCLUSION

The first months of CPSC operation have been a "honeymoon" period, marked by generally favorable press coverage, 80
and good relations with Congress81 and consumer groups. 82 But
the Commission has not yet begun its major work: the setting of
product safety rules and the use of the various enforcement tools
available to it. The hard decisions that are sure to arise in these
areas will provide a true test of the agency's worth.
The CPSC has engaged in sincere efforts to make consumers
aware of its existence, to communicate product-hazard information to the public, and to attract consumer complaints. But these
measures are basically peripheral to the more formidable challenge of achieving meaningful consumer involvement in the Commission's decision-making processes.
A basic prerequisite is the recognition of the enormous imbalance between the mass of consumers, consumer organizations,
and consumer advocates on the one hand, and the regulated in78. See letter from Peter H. Schuck and James A. Brodsky, Washington office, Consumers Union, to Richard 0. Simpson, Chairman, CPSC, Dec. 17, 1973 (copy on file with
author). The letter complains that no public notice was given of at least two meetings
between CPSC staff members and representatives of the manufacturers of an adhesive
glue that was the subject of a prior letter from the authors to the Commission requesting
that regulatory action be taken against this product. The lack of notice on the CPSC
public calendar was a violation of Commission regulations. See note 51, supra.
79. Letter from Richard 0. Simpson, Chairman, CPSC, to Peter H. Schuck, Director,
Washington office, Consumers Union, Jan. 25, 1974 (copy on file with author).
80. The Washington Post has criticized the Commission for allowing candles with
lead-core wicks on the market. Editorial, Poisonous Candles, Washington Post, Jan. 8,
1974, at A18, col. 1. The Wall Street Journal has taken the Commission to task for its
proposed rules on Section 15 defect notification. Editorial, Hold on to Your Hats, Wall
St. J., Aug. 21, 1973, at 4, col. 1.
81. But see 119 CoNG. REc. E 5564 (Sept. 5, 1973); id. at S. 16385, S. 16402 (Sept.
12, 1973); id. at E. 5768 (Sept. 13, 1973)(Congressional criticism of proposed cigarette ban
by CPSC).
82. The first heavy criticism from consumers came about in a letter to the Commission from the Health Research Group expressing impatience with CPSC delay in dealing
with consumer petitions relating to toys and children's sleepwear. See 3 PRoouCT SAFETY
LETIER 1 (No.5, Feb. 4, 1974).
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dustries on the other. The list of comments received by the Commission on proposed rules dealing with defect notification under
§ 1583 reveals fifty five submissions by corporate representatives
and three offered on behalf of consumers. 8~ The financial resources at the disposal of consumer groups for involvement in
CPSC activity is infinitesimal when compared to what industry
can bring to bear. Indeed, the consumer perception of a shared
interest in product-safety regulation is primitive in comparison
with the immediacy of corporate reaction to agency threats to
financial interests.
·
Therefore, the Commission cannot regard itself as mediating
between interest groups competing on the same level. It must
seek ways, consistent with its statutory mandate, to support
those for whose benefit the Act was passed. The appointment of
an in-house consumer advocate-liaison85 would have been a positive step in this direction. Another helpful measure would be the
use of§ 27(g) 86 to allocate funds to help stimulate and structure
consumer involvement.
On the consumer side, existing groups have a responsibility
to make use of the CPSC public calendar and press releases to
disseminate information about the Act and the work of the Commission. They must also explore ways to enlist the support of
academicians and professionals in the development and enforcement of product safety rules.
The effort to engage consumers in CPSC activity must be
regarded as a long-range process of consciousness-raising and
education. The Commission has legal tools to help accomplish
this task. Whether it has the patience and creative imagination
remains to be seen.
83. CPSC, Noncomplying or Defective Consumer Product, 38 Fed. Reg. 20902 (Aug.
3, 1973).
84. CPSC, Comments by Date of Receipt (copy of list on file with author).
85. See notes 77-79 supra, and accompanying text.
86. Section 27(g) states that "[t]he Commission is authorized to enter into contracts
with governmental entities, private organizations, or individuals for the conduct of activities authorized by this Act."

